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Social science research on organized interest groups during the 1950s and 
1960s was primarily concerned with issues such as "domination by interest 
groups", the classical channels of influence of organized interests upon govern-
ment, and the self-image of these "intermediate powers". The discussion, how-
ever, soon threatened to become repetitive and dissolve into indiscriminate 
accusations regarding the threat or encroachment of a corporate state, on 
the one hand, or a trade union state on the other. 
Since the early 1970s, though, the discussion of the role of interest groups 
has found a new impetus and freed itself of its restrictive boundaries by tack-
ling a series of new topics. Though the subject of "domination by interest 
groups" and the identification of power factors remains of central concern 
- and rightly so - , it is now being subjected to a more discriminating analysis. 
Three additional research questions have become the focus of interest: 
1. the internal organizational structure of interest groups and the opportuniti-
es for the organization's members to participate in and have an influence 
upon the organization itself (internal democracy and countervailing power); 
2. the possibility of articulating interests which have previously been organized 
only with difficulty or not at all ("the new social question" and competition 
with previously underestimated interests); 
3. the legalization of organized interests within the overall framework of polit-
ical or economic interests (corporate law, concerted action, economic and 
social councils, etc.). 
This last topic primarily concerns larger associations in the area of labor 
and industry, in other words the parties to collective labor negotiations. The 
interests which they represent are not in any sense merely of a "private" 
nature, but have in fact a considerable, unavoidable effect on the broader 
public. This is obvious, for example, in the case of labor disputes and industrial 
peace. Whenever the controverses between the parties on the labor market 
* The author wishes to thank Dipl. Soz. Karl Lenz for making suggestions for correc-
tions, and Martha Baker-Cassidy for the translation. 
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become sharper, the question arises as to whether and how a peaceful bal-
ancing of interests could be given institutional form. Whilever the sociological 
discussion fails to adopt a specifically conflict-oriented position, it is unable 
to formulate a peace model which can justly be described as liberal (freiheit-
lich). Though the socalled "Peace Agreement" (Friedensabkommen) may accu-
rately be said to provide such a model, it has been neglected in the international 
discussion of collective bargaining and industrial relations (FLANDERS [1969], 
SHONFIELD [1968], SCHMITTER and L E M B R U C H [1979]). In fact, reference to 
Switzerland always gives rise to astonished disbelief in this context because 
of the almost unimaginably small number of strikes and the "heavenly" peace-
fulness which marks the reconciliation of differing demands in the labor mar-
ket. But the basis for this state usually remains unknown, and this despite 
the fact that the Contract of Cooperation was renewed in 1983 for the eleventh 
time, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly half a century. 
In this connection the general problem of the modern "society of interest 
groups" will first be outlined so as to establish the framework necessary for 
the discussion of the Swiss Peace Agreement with which this article is con-
cerned (Section 1). Then the past history and main points of the agreement 
will be presented as informational background (Section 2) in order to discuss, 
in conclusion, the implications and possibilities this agreement may provide 
as a model for other industrial societies (Section 3). 
1. The Problem of Interest Groups in Society 
1.1. Industrial Society as a Society of Interest Groups 
Contemporary social reality has moved considerably beyond the ideas of clas-
sical liberalism. In general, it can no longer be assumed that the political 
will and economic processes stem from the will of isolated individuals. The 
development which today is described as "increasing social concentration" 
began in the middle of the last century and is understood to be the need 
(and necessity) of individuals to join together in organizations which actively 
pursue their interests in fields outside the organization itself (v. B E Y M E [1980], 
A L M O N D [1971]). 
This process has been considerably accelerated in the wake of the increasing 
organization of social relations and - correspondingly - the development of 
specialized social- and welfare-oriented service agencies (FORSTHOFF [1950]) 
in industrial societies (the Intervention state'). Today, collective bargaining 
units are not merely tolerated or accepted as agents of political and economic 
opinion-leadership, but have even become so influential that the title of 
Eschenburg's lecture, in which the question was posed "Domination by Inter-
est Groups?" has become a catchword (ESCHENBURG 1955], BRIEFS [1961], 
K I E L M A N N S E G G [1979]). The fact that the question mark is usually replaced 
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by an exclamation point does not mean, of course, that no further question 
remain to be posed; on the contrary. 
At least in the case of mass interest groups, among which the organized 
labor-market groups occupy the most prominent position, it is evident that 
the extent of their sphere of activity as well as the degree of influence they 
exert on the socio-political process is steadily increasing. Their personnel fre-
quently overlaps with that of political parties, they are represented in public 
institutions, and they are recognized as important informational sources for 
administrative and legislative activity. (STAMMER and WEINGART [1972], 
p. 186 f.) As a result, the chances which individuals or even larger social units 
have of satisfying their interests are reduced if they are not able to secure 
the "strong influence of a patron at the societal level (an association) which 
represents this interest" (FORSTHOFF [1964], p. 204f.) (the problem of the right 
of free association: the problem of calculable "potential disturbance factors")1. 
The activity of interest groups has thus led to considerable change in the 
structure of society and the process of political opinion-leadership ("quasi-
governmental status") ( M A T Z [1977], p. 89; JONAS [1974], p. 135). Particularly 
with regard to the large collective bargaining parties, it can be said that their 
integration in the political system has become a problem in itself. In addition 
to the questions concerning the legitimacy of such influence, the social function 
of these associations, and their internal structure, there is the problem of 
the relationship of large interest groups to one another, for example with 
regard to the regulation of industrial disputes. 
1.2. Interest-Group Autonomy Between Conflict and Consensus 
The question of institutional regulation is not at ali easy to resolve. The reason 
is that there appears to be no authoritative body against which the specific 
legitimacy of the particular interests could be assessed, especially when such 
groups claim to be acting in the public interest. (JONAS [1974], p. 1341). A l l 
that remains is a system based on collectively organized freedom to enter into 
contracts on the labor market, where the contractual partners have extensive 
autonomous regulative powers (autonomy of labor negotiations) (RUETHERS 
[1973], p. 22; M U E L L E R - J E N T S C H [1983], p. 123). 
1.3. The Conflict-Theoretical Interpretation of Interest-Group Autonomy 
Interest-group autonomy does not imply that regulatory guidelines are no 
longer needed, but rather that these associations are not bound to substantive 
sets of interests established a priori which extend beyond the legal order estab-
lished by the state. The definition of valid interests is the result of the auto-
1 This problem has recently been throughly examined under the rubric "new political 
economy". (See BERNHOLZ [1974]; D O W N S [1974]). 
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nomous regulation of disputes or "conjunctive bargaining" ( C H A M B E R L A I N 
and K U H N [1955]) in which each contracting party does its best to prevent 
the other side from achieving superiority. If this definition is to be achieved, 
the antagonisms and status positions must meet in conflict with each other 
with as little interference from outside as possible. The fundamental readiness 
to apply pressure step-by-step (scalar) all the way up to labor disputes requires, 
in addition, equality of weapons between the two parties. This point already 
makes it clear that a model of this type differs from one of class struggle, 
in which the aim of each party is ultimately to be free of the other ( B U E H L 
[1972], p. 24). 
The dealings of the interest groups with each other remain, however, con-
flict-laden and thus fully grounded in sociological conflict theory, which ex-
pects society to be ordered by conflict or, rather, perceives society as nothing 
but than a "society of conflict", simply because conflict is a necessary element 
of all forms of association organized on the basis of power and authority 
(Herrschaftsverbände) (DAHRENDORF [1965]). And indeed, it is a fact that inter-
ests, needs, norms and primary concerns vary. The question is merely whether 
the institutionalizing of conflict - as Dahrendorf sees it - can guarantee in 
every case a productive direction. In any case, A.F. Bentley and his group-
theory school (Truman, Latham) also seem to be convinced of it, since any 
"community of interest" (Gemeinschaftsinteresse) is for them fictitious so long 
as it is not reducible to the "sum of the interests of the various units". Politics 
may then safely be regarded as the inventory of the results of group-struggles 
("cash-register theory") (BENTLEY [1949], N A R R and N A S C H O L D [1971], 
p.206ff). 
Briefs has correctly recognized that such an understanding of autonomous 
conflict settlement by collective bargaining parties involves carrying over a 
market model to the group level, because the classical (single)-individualism 
is thereby replaced by "group-individualism" (BRIEFS [1952], p. 22). In place 
of the free competition of individuals, as it is envisioned by an individualistic 
liberalism, there then appears the free competition of groups struggling with 
each other en bloc. "From this point of view today's pluralistic society appears 
as the second phase of classical liberalism" (BRIEFS [1968], p. 204). The assump-
tions of laissez-faire remain, but the subject is a different one: "The ethos 
of self-interest which earlier applied to the individual has become the ethos 
of group-interest: in place of individuals, groups now attempt to maximize 
the interests which they have defined." (BRIEFS [1968], p. 204; N I G G E M A N N 
[1971],p.39ff). 
Such a logic of commission and omission for autonomous groups should 
not be implicitly regarded as "harmonious", as so often seems to occur in 
sociological conflict theories2. There is something to be said for the idea that 
2 In this way even DAHRENDORF ([1965]. p. 7) is forced to presume the effectiveness 
of "public virtues", although this resembles a "secret global mysticism" in view of 
his conflict-oriented ontology (v. B E Y M E [1972], p.233). 
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the "bargainings-model in fact gives impulse to a socially destructive mechan-
ism. Even the acceptance of minimum norms (Grenzethos) must in the long 
run appear as a hindrance for those who are oriented purely towards prevailing 
in the industrial power-struggle. To secure the necessary freedom of movement 
and short run advantages in battle, one attempts to undermine the accepted 
ways of conducting disputes (DOWNS [1968], p. 23, 29). The smaller the basis 
of common values, the more intensive the polarization of the parties: the 
more antagonistic the interests, the stronger the tendency to depress the ex-
isting minimum norms through submarginal practices (BRIEFS [1968], 
p. 197ff.). Whoever adheres to the old standards will be deprived of equality 
in weapons; he will have to adapt himself to submarginal forms of behavior. 
It can be anticipated that, at any given time, the next lower, barely tolerated 
ethical level will already be under consideration. The new "normal state" 
of conformity is thus not a state of equilibrium (at a lower level): its deteriora-
tion is already pre-programmed. Without built-in stabilizing factors which 
establish limits to the inflation of conflict (Konfliktinflation) ^ H E T T L A G E and 
T R A P P E [1976], p. 80), the return to archaic forms of conflict going all the 
way to elimination of the opponent could hardly be avoided ( B U E H L [1976]). 
It is immediately evident that the bargaining contract itself receives its 
character from the totalized perspective of conflict. To establish a long-term 
commitment would be downright "dysfunctional". Only by accepting short-
term safeguarding of material property and keeping the (legal) non-material 
terms of contract largely "open" is it possible to avoid destroying the chances 
which future conflicts could offer. Only then do collective contracts satisfy 
the criteria of a cease-fire; but they do not have the unifying effect of a 
peace settlement. 
1.4. The Search for Integration-Oriented Cooperation in Interest Groups 
There is, of course, no doubt that particularized interest positions are often 
articulated only through interaction with other interests. Only in this way 
can the general interest be delimited in a pluralistic society, and conflicts 
can thus have a clarifying and integrating effect. Yet they cannot provide 
an exclusive organizing principle. Every conflict-oriented society must urgently 
seek possibilities for controlling conflict, since no discursive process can be 
stable and successful without the preservation of overriding concerns, i.e. with-
out the willingness to achieve consensus and "to equilibrate interests while 
respecting the interests of the opposing side" (Cox [1980], p. 149). 
The sociology of interest groups is not lacking in explanatory models and, 
in the political sphere, there has been no shortage of political attempts to 
find standard measures of orientation which go beyond the pure representation 
of interests. They differ, among other things, as to whether the equilibration 
of particular interests is undertaken from political expediency and whether 
a common basis of values is voluntarily sought. 
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1.4.1. The Corporate State Approach 
In state corporatism, the initiative for integrating interest groups is shifted 
onto a third party, the government, which applies discipline to the labor mar-
ket with a "heavy hand" according to the principles of unity and order. Since 
all societal elements are to be joined together in a common body from which 
cooperative instead of conflictive processes are to proceed (WINKLER [1976]), 
bargaining parties are brought together, too, in a common organization. Com-
mon interests are pre-supposed and prescribed. The integrative and innovative 
function of competing and conflicting interests is denied3. Worker producti-
vity, entrepreneurship, and cooperation between employees and employers 
are legally established obligations. Conflicts thus remain out of the question, 
and differences of interest are submitted to compulsory arbitration. 
"The corporatist value is discipline, not liberty. The corporatist vice is 
licence, not compulsion. Corporatism trusts neither in the spontaneous agree-
ment of individual goals, nor in the reconciliation by an invisible hand. Collab-
oration must be organized and enforced" (WINKLER [1976], p. 107). 
Consequently, the government sees itself not merely as an organ of control 
in regard to the activities of interest groups, but also as the direct mobilizing 
agent of collective endeavors. In practice this extends far beyond the interven-
tionism of current day "planned capitalism". 
1.4.2. Neo-Corperatist Tendencies in Western Europe 
The fascist corporate state not merely brought the term "corporative" into 
ill-repute, but also any appeal for cooperation among interest groups. This 
has long prevented the idea of a liberal and free solution of integration pro-
blems from being examined. Only in recent years have the works of Lehm-
bruch, Shonfield, Schmitter, Winkler and others brought attention to the fact 
that Western industrial nations have been almost uniformly searching for ways 
of bringing interest groups, and especially collective bargaining groups, away 
from battle-front positions and toward a more forward-looking, mutual and 
peaceful coordination of interests (among other things, also in hopes of facili-
tating governmental macroeconomic planning). But of course the integration 
ought to proceed in as voluntary a way as possible. Nevertheless, it cannot 
be overlooked that various forms of social partnership, social contracts, and 
dialogues have in essence developed out of corporatist thought4, though this 
3 The distaste for competition shows that state corporatism can in no way only 
be seen as a "right-wing" idea. Similar lines of thinking can be found at the other 
end of the spectrum, among anarcho-syndicalists, English guild socialists (G.D.H. Cole) 
and a number of French socialists (G. Sorel). It is a typical curtailment of the debate 
over interest groups to brand corporatism as fascist. This was clearly pointed out by 
HERMENS([1968] , p.204ff.) 
4 The most comprehensive definition of corporatism to date is that provided by 
Schmitter (SCHMITTER and L E H M B R U C H [1979], p.66f). He specifies the following crite-
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is usually not state corporatism but rather a "social corporatism" (SCHMITTER 
[1979], p. 20). The institutional solutions are generally directed at preventing 
conflicts which arise from a plurality of interest groups by bringing the groups 
to the conference table at an early stage. The legalization of dialogue is in-
tended to prevent the conflict from being carried out in the streets. This is 
also intended to lead the conflicting parties to a readiness to agree to a cease-
fire in the short term and towards a "common-project" laid out for the long-
term (MASSE [1965], p. 153; B L O C H - L A I N E [1959]). 
(1) Interest groups are more likely to be motivated toward longterm plan-
ning when they are incorporated into a governmental guidance system ("gov-
ernmental theory" of social contract) (CHAMBERLAIN [1951], p. 61). This can 
take place through a chamber system (with partly public and partly private 
"double representation" of interests) as in Austria (KLOSE [1970], S C H A M B E C K 
[1975], L E H M B R U C H [1979]): or by the participation of interest groups in overall 
planning through economic and social councils, as in the "Stichting van de 
arbeid" of the Netherlands, the "National Economic Development Councils" 
in England, or the commissions de modernisation in France (HETTLAGE [1971], 
G E R S B A C H [1980], H E T T L A G E [1983]). Finally, the government can also content 
itself with inviting the collective bargaining parties into institutionalized "hear-
ings" like those envisaged by concerted action {Konzertierte Aktion) in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It was expected that the possibility of a com-
munication forum set up by the government would allow the conflict to be 
conducted in a more objective and relaxed manner ( A D A M [1973], H E T T L A G E 
[1974], H A R D E S [1974]). 
(2) In contrast to governmental "indicative" solutions, the managerial theo-
ry of the social contract starts from the position that it is the bargaining 
parties themselves who are willing to enter into agreements and participate 
in the planning of mutual interests, because they see themselves as elements 
of a unified industrial system or technostructure and thereby functionally re-
lated to each other ( G A L B R A I T H [1979], M A Y E R [1973], G A E F G E N [1977]). In 
these terms, the logic of highly technical, research-intensive, high-risk, concen-
trated economic activity offers the interest groups neither the opportunity 
nor the occasion to view themselves as opposing power groups. The dividing 
line between decision makers and those who are subject to their decisions 
becomes more and more unclear. Each group is dependent on the other and 
can achieve its goals only through cooperation (cooperative bargaining) 
( C H A M B E R L A I N and K U H N [1964]). The conviction that their interests are paral-
lel seems to have replaced the idea of class struggle. It is not the case that 
divergent interests have been disposed of a priori, or that each party does 
not want to emerge from the negotiations as successful as possible, but simply 
a matter of taking into account their interdependency. 
ria: limited number, singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, 
functionally differentiated, recognition by State, representational monopoly. These ele-
ments are so open-ended that they apply equally to state and social corporatism. 
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"Where interests are accepted as common rather than divergent, the notion 
that the agreement sums up what had to be given up or all that could be 
gained fades: the parties approach bargaining with the realization that the 
better the performance for each, the better the joint performance. Further, 
each understands that the better the joint performance, the greater the advan-
tage for both" (CHAMBERLAIN and K U H N [1965], p. 429). 
In some cases such voluntary social partnerships are agreed upon explicitly 
in order to forestall a governmental "directive" or imperative dealing with 
collective-bargaining problems and to preserve their range of maneuverability 
through "timely reasonableness". 
Having laid out the framework, we can now turn to the question of whether 
the Swiss Peace Agreemeent also has value and feasibility for imitation by 
other highly developed industrial countries, and in particular the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Since the Swiss form of social contact between indus-
trial partners is largely unknown in the field of interest-group research, the 
history and essential aspects of this peace agreement will be very briefly sum-
marized (for further details see H E T T L A G E [1981], ZANETTI [1980], p. 162ff.). 
2. The Swiss Peace Agreement as "Cooperative Bargaining" 
As Switzerland today is considered to be a heaven of industrial peace, the 
fact is often overlooked that this has not always been the case. Until the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, the Swiss Trade Union Association (SGB), the 
most powerful unified trade union in Sitzerland today, was oriented fairly 
clearly towards the idea of class struggle. Labor disputes based on that stand-
point reached their peak in the years between 1900-1914 and from 1918 
('General Strike') to 1920. Thus the last large dispute occurred a relatively 
long time ago. Since the end of the 1930s the character of the disputes over 
interests between industrial bargaining parties has fundamentally changed. 
This may be seen clearly in Table 1. Decisive for the change was the first 
Table I 
Collectively Bargained Labor Disputes in Switzerland Between 1927 and 1980 
Year Strikes or Enterprises Employees Work-days 
Lock-outs Involved Involved Lost 
1927 26 328 2,058 34,160 
1928 45 283 5,474 98,015 
1929 39 551 4,661 99,608 
1930 31 322 6,397 265,695 
1931 25 161 4,746 73,975 
1932 38 198 5,083 159,154 
1933 35 267 2,705 69,065 
1934 20 163 2,763 33,309 
1935 17 82 874 15,143 
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Continued from Table 1 
Year Strikes or Enterprises Employees Work-days 
Lock-outs Involved Involved Lost 
1936 41 302 3,612 38,789 
1937 37 404 6,043 115,648 
1938 17 38 706 16,299 
1939 77 7 238 4,046 
1940 6 12 578 1,480 
1941 15 36 722 14,311 
1942 19 31 822 4,030 
1943 19 114 1,069 12,050 
1944 18 186 1,324 17,690 
1945 35 179 3,686 37,187 
1946 55 443 15,173 184,483 
1947 29 745 6,963 102,209 
1948 28 463 4,277 61,408 
1949 12 139 853 41,113 
1950 6 68 288 5,447 
1951 8 70 985 8,469 
1952 8 47 1,207 11,588 
1953 6 513 2,079 61,124 
1954 6 283 2,997 25,963 
1955 4 4 430 1,036 
1956 5 15 286 1,439 
1957 2 3 71 740 
1958 3 3 815 2,127 
1959 4 15 126 1,987 
I960 8 20 214 1,016 
1961 - - - -1962 2 2 163 1,386 
1963 4 73 1,120 70,698 
1964 1 4 350 4,550 
1965 2 2 23 163 
1966 2 2 38 62 
1967 1 1 65 1,690 
1968 1 1 70 1,785 
1969 1 1 33 231 
1970 3 3 320 2,623 
1971 11 13 2,267 7,491 
1972 5 5 526 2,002 
1973 - - - -
1974 3 34 299 2,777 
1975 6 6 323 1,733 
1976 19 492 2,395 19,586 
1977 9 54 1,380 4,049 
1978 10 13 1,240 5,317 
1979 8 8 463 2,331 
1980 5 330 3,582 5,718 
Peace 
Agreement 
of 19.7.1937 
Source: ILO Bulletin of Labour Statistics, Geneva 1981. Statistisches Jahrbuch der 
Schweiz, Bern 1981. 
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"Peace Agreement" of the machine and metal-working industries in 1937. 
Just a few striking statistics are sufficient to show the fundamental shift in 
the understanding of disputes since that time. 
In the 43-year period between 1938 and 1980 Switzerland lost only about 
750,000 workdays through strikes and lockouts, an average of about 17,500 
days per year. In the period 1928-1937, the 11 years before the Peace Agree-
ment, there were 1 million lost workdays, at a yearly average of 91,000. When 
the overall period under review here is subdivided into 5 decades from 1928 
to 1977, the tendency towards the virtual elimination of labor disputes becomes 
even clearer. While the losses in the first decade (1928-37) averaged nearly 
97,000 working days annually, in the second decade, immediately following 
the conclusion of the Peace Agreement, they amounted to less than half that 
number (about 39,000 working days). In the succeeding 10 year intervals the 
corresponding values continued to decrease and reached in the period 1968-77 
an average of only 4228 days. This represents, by comparison, 4.4% of the 
figure for the first decade and 10,7% of the second. Other comparisons are 
equally significant. Between 1968 und 1978, when Switzerland lost on the 
average only 4327 workdays, the Federal Republic lost more than 1 million, 
Italy 20 million and the United States 41 million workdays. Even when one 
takes the differential employment figures into account, the contrast remains 
quite impressive (ILO, 1979)4a. In the years between 1956 and 1980 only 45 
businesses per year on the average were involved in labor disputes, and it 
is not uncommon to find years in which less than 10 businesses and less 
than 500 employees were involved in disputes. 
These few figures may suffice to give an outline of the singular situation 
of this model of social partnership. 
The conclusion of the Peace Agreement in 1937 was linked to both interna-
tional and domestic factors. On the international scene, the 1930s were marked 
by the rising National Socialism which triggered political unrest in Switzerland 
as well, and led the Swiss trade union leadership to the insight that only 
a radical change in the previous collective bargaining policies could forestall 
the endangering of the labor movement in their country. The world-wide eco-
nomic crisis had also caused high unemployment in Switzerland, with the 
export industries including the machine and watch-making industries being 
4 a The following statistics compare the number of days lost in collective labor actions 
with the total number of wage earners for the USA, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany 
and Switzerland during the period 1968-80: 
Average Size 
of Workforce 
(in Millions) 
Average Number 
of Work-days Lost 
(in Millions) 
U S A 79,539 41 
Italy 19,725 20 
Federal Republic of Germany 25,434 1,041 
Switzerland 3,041 0,055 
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Figure I 
Work-days lost by labor disputes in Switzerland (1927-1980) 
1930 1937 1940 
Source: of Table 1. 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
particularly affected. At the end of 1936, the Swiss government (Bundesrai) 
decided to devalue the Swiss franc in order to increase export opportunities. 
At the same time, the possibility of state-legislated compulsory arbitration 
was introduced in order to prevent the success of these measures being endan-
gered by social tensions. The collective-bargaining parties forestalled this gov-
ernmental ordinance through a direct agreement over a voluntary arbitration 
process, namely the Peace Agreement of July 19, 1937. It was initially agreed 
upon for two years, later then for five years, and has remained in effect since 
that time without interruption (at the moment until mid 1988). 
Under this agreement the contractual partners commit themselves to "clear 
up important differences of opinion and all issues of dispute in good faith" 
and, for the duration of the contract, "to unconditionally preserve the peace". 
(Peace Agreement of 1937). In this case the peace obligation is absolute: during 
the five year term of the contract, no form of work stoppage is permitted. 
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This applies also to questions dealing with employment conditions which are 
not regulated by the contract. This ruling extends clearly over and beyond 
the relative obligation, upon which, for example, the German collective 
bargaining agreements are based, and which only forbids stoppages of work 
related to wage issues. 
Industrial peace is linked with norms of negotiation. Not only are all differ-
ences of opinion to be resolved in general through negotiation, but each party 
also commits itself to enter into negotiations, even during the contract period, 
as soon as one of the bargaining parties considers it necessary. 
In Switzerland the most important settlements are negotiated while the 
Peace Agreement is still in effect. These negotiations have the advantage of 
not having to reach a conclusion under the pressure of time. Furthermore, 
both parties are committed to "endeavor to arrive at a resolution in good 
faith". Each side enters the discussion with a large measure of willingness 
to negotiate and grants the other party a certain measure of confidence in 
advance (Vertrauensvorschuss). Neither of them is supposed to expect more 
than it can demand after taking all aspects into account, and neither party 
should hold back anything which it is in a position to perform. They are 
to orient themselves in the long run to the "common good" and benefit of 
the society by committing themselves to displaying understanding for the inter-
ests of both sides. 
In the Peace Agreement, an elaborate version of a "constitutional statute" 
was agreed upon for the regulation of the differences of opinion which are 
inherent in the labor world in spite of a fundamental attitude of compromise. 
It is necessary here to differentiate between legal disputes and regulatory dis-
putes. Collective legal disputes, which deal with the interpretation of an exist-
ing legal norm, fall under the jurisdiction of a labor court so long as no 
other settlement agency is specified in the contract. Regulatory disputes, i.e. 
conflicts over questions which have not yet been covered in a collectively 
bargained contract, are the object of negotiations between the industrial bar-
gaining parties. The settlements provide for a four-stage arbitration procedure: 
Stage 1: Negotiations at the Enterprise Level 
Conflicts are to be dealt with and regulated first of all at the enterprise level 
between the employees' committee and the company management. 
Stage 2: Negotiations at the Interest Group Level 
In case no agreement is reached, both sides may arrange for a dispute over 
regulations to be negotiated between the employers' association and the 
employees' union. 
Stages 3: Governmental Settlement Board 
If no agreement can be reached in the second stage, the case is presented 
to the governmental settlement board, which has a judge as its chairman 
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and two panel members recommended by the parties to the wage bargain. 
This office of arbitration is convened at the request of the negotiating parties, 
or it may decide ex officio to step in when there is a danger that serious 
conflict may develop. According to the extent of the conflict, the settlement 
board is convened at the cantonal, regional or federal level. It attempts initially 
to bring about an immediate understanding between the parties and can com-
pel them to take part in investigative proceedings. Negotiation and the pro-
vision of the information requested is compulsory (Einlassungszwang). If the 
mediation does not succeed, the board presents its own recommendations 
for reconciliation, but it is not empowered to compel their acceptance. It 
lays down a short deadline (normally 10 days), at the end of which the parties 
are expected to communicate their unconditional acceptance or refusal. 
Stage 4: Referee Procedure 
If this attempt has also failed, there follows a final phase, which has almost 
never been required in the past 46 years, the referee procedure. It is the func-
tion of the arbitration office to ask the parties if they are prepared to submit 
(without previous knowledge) to the decision of a referee. If they declare 
themselves ready to do so, the decision is then announced by the referee. 
Should the referee procedure be rejected, the negotiation efforts are ended, 
because the obligation to peace is not to be enforced by compulsory arbitra-
tion. There still remains one further sanction: the settlement board must in-
form the public of the grounds for the refusal and name the party which 
rejected the recommendations. It is hoped that this final sanction, the pressure 
of public opinion, will succeed in promoting an attitude of compromise be-
tween the bargaining parties. 
As an additional guarantee of the industrial peace, the contractual parties 
have the duty to see that their members observe the conditions of the Peace 
Agreement. They are to provide information, issue warnings and instructions, 
as well as apply certain methods prescribed by statute, such as disciplinary 
actions, monetary penalties, and measures similar to a boycott, including even 
exclusion from the association. This so-called "implementation obligation" 
(Einwirkungspflicht) has been extended to all comprehensive labor contracts 
in Switzerland and is regulated by law. In regard to the enactment of contracts, 
the parties are also legally empowered to form a contractual association with 
extended rights. In practice this includes controls, supervisory measures, and 
commissions drawn equally from the two sides which then prescribe sanctions. 
The Peace Agreement relating to the machinery and metal-working industries 
has had in many respects an extraordinary effect on the general collective 
bargaining contracts (Gesamtarbeitsverträge, G A V ) . The modern G A V include 
a legal section in which the rights and duties of the contract parties are largely 
oriented towards the model provided by the Peace Agreement. Since 1945 
the G A V have assumed increasing significance in Switzerland. Currently there 
are about 1400 such contracts, which cover about 1.5 million (out of 3 million) 
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wage earners (THOMMEN [1980], p. 5). Two-thirds of all G A V have made the 
absolute peace obligation into a basic principle, while the remaining third 
recognize the relative peace obligation. In view of the fact that the multi-stage 
arbitration process is applicable in all case, the G A V can correctly be described 
as "Peace Agreements". Since the absolute peace obligation is, in effect, in 
nearly all State (Land) and Canton contracts, approximately 90% of the 
employees covered by the G A V are obliged to observe the unconditional indus-
trial peace (THOMMEN [1980], p. 12). 
3. The Model-like Character of the Peace Agreement 
Before inquiring into the model-like character of the collective settlement of 
conflicts in Switzerland, the term "model" must first be clarified. Something 
may be used as a model which is a map reproducing reality precisely as it 
exists, but on a smaller scale. In this sense the "Swiss Model" would be a 
map which other industrialized countries could follow, as it were, just by 
changing the scale. It is immediately evident that a model in this sense cannot 
be intended. 
By "model" one can also mean a goal, a heuristic instrument, or a prototype, 
against which one's own analogous, and realistic solution is to be measured. 
The model has an objective core, or nucleus, of reality which can be combined 
with various realms of possibility (Möglichkeitsfelder) ( W A G N E R [1979], p. 102; 
R Y A N [1973], p. 126ff.) In the sense in which the word "Model" will be applied 
here, the "Swiss Model" does not produce any valid statements dealing, for 
instance, with the objective reality which exists in Germany, yet it still could 
be useful as an "objective nucleus" to be linked up with the elements existing 
in this "realm of possibility". Is Switzerland a model in this sense? Is the 
objective nucleus of its social partnership transferable? The answer depends, 
in part, on the evaluation of the functional conditions which have shaped 
and sustained "cooperative bargaining" in Switzerland. 
3.1. Prerequisites and Functional Conditions of the Peace Agreement 
Leaving aside the particular economic and political conditions which con-
tributed to the contract of 1937 and undoubtedly functioned to promote soli-
darity, it is necessary to seek additional explanations for the endurance of 
this agreement and its extensive influence. They may be found in the particular 
features of the social and political structure of Switzerland and its cultural 
identity. 
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3.1.1. Some Social-Structural Features Peculiar to Switzerland 
The Peace Agreement is connected to a significant degree with socio-political 
features peculiar to Switzerland and with forms of communication which are 
based upon them. 
(1) Switzerland is not only a small country but, moreover, a cluster of 
microcosms ("Traube von Mikrokosmen", S A U R M A [1974]) as well. It is a land 
differentiated into segments based on cultural, language, confessional, politics, 
and regional federalism. As the "prototype du pays composite" (GIROD [1978]) 
it has always had a very high need for measures leading to consensus and 
for attitudes oriented toward equilibration between conflicting interests. This 
fact is reflected in the political structure and the means of arriving at decisions. 
Conditioned by the high degree of autonomy at the cantonal and local levels, 
the federal system can function only through the political art of coexistence 
and consensus which becomes perfected at the party level. To all appearances, 
the disputes between the parties are not aimed at eliminating the opposition. 
Instead, the parties seem to concede each other a sort of perpetual right to 
participate in the exercise of power. This attitude finds expression in all-party 
governments at the cantonal and federal levels (the so-called "Magic formula") 
("Zauberformel"). Extremely small minorities have no chance under this sys-
tem, because this collegial attitude is oriented towards equilibration, towards 
keeping rivalries on a low-burner, and towards appearing to the public as 
the "basic agreement of al l" or the "'dictatorship' of the silent majority" 
(GIROD [1978], p. 12). The consequences are moderation in political postulates 
and the attachment of high value to the established order. New and far-
reaching demands inspire per se no confidence; they must first "mature" in 
the political game of equilibration, i.e. they must pass through the ritual of 
compromise and prove their worth in the "negotiational culture" ("Verhand-
lungskultur") (HOEPFLINER [1976]). 
In presenting their demands the collective bargaining parties are also bound 
to this system, if they do not want to be accused of behaving in an "un-Swiss" 
fashion by orienting themselves too heavily towards foreign examples. Not 
only do attempts by individual leaders to build up a personal profile through 
belligerent public appearances engender the mistrust aroused by anything for-
eign, the same is true for any contribution of substance which is "unbalanced", 
because it would alter the status quo too quickly and radically. 
(2) Despite the complexity of this system of equilibration of interests, and 
despite the fact that negotiation is highly valued and disagreements between 
interest groups are handled within closed circles ( F A R A G O [1980], p. 230 ; L E V Y 
[1978], p. 80), these circumstances seem - paradoxically - to be transparent 
enough to the individual citizen. The reason for this is again to be found 
in the smallness of the country and the autonomy of the communities, which 
- by international standards - allow the authorities closer contact to their 
citizens and prevent decisions and conflicts from being carried out at too 
great a distance from the political basis. Girod has rightly pointed out the 
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remarkable phenomenon that a small journalistic campaign, a short and well-
defined work-slowdown, or a demonstration by a small group can have such 
reverberations in the cantonal political scene that negotiations take place 
between the authorities and the dissatisfied citizens before a mass-movement 
and large scale basis for conflict can even develop (GIROD, [1978], p. 12). 
(3) Short communication channels also result because of another aspect 
of Switzerland's being a small state. Small societies are faced with the problem 
of personnel shortages and this affects services that are taken for granted 
in highly developed countries (Strukturknappheit). They solve this problem, 
for instance, by an increased "poly valence", i.e. by promoting persons who 
can handle multiple functions and exercise many roles. Such persons must 
be available to fulfill numerous other roles simultaneously e.g., at the military 
and the parliament level. Thus the level of performance which is to be expected 
from an institution must necessarily be kept relatively nonspecific and flexible 
(GESER and HOEPFLINGER [1976]). On the whole, such a high level of intercon-
nectedness of personnel brings about a significant "tendency toward informa-
lizing the macrostructural and internal organizational relationships". - (GESER 
and HOEPFLINGER [1976], p. 40). The contact network between those who hold 
"polyvalent functions" is extremely tight, because they encounter each other 
repeatedly in various functions. This leads to "endlessly inverted cliques, and 
lobbies" ( L U E T H Y [1965]) but also to an "esprit de corps" and mutual familiar-
ity (Personalisierungseffekt). The fact that the interest group functionaries not 
only encounter each other in specific function (with correspondingly high force 
of legitimacy), but also intensify their contact in various gatherings, may even 
be regarded as one of the conditions which has been decisive in the achieve-
ment of the long years of industrial peace. Acquaintance and familiarity with 
one another produce a tradition of mutual understanding. The informal, "fric-
tionless" possibilities for exercising sanctions on behavior increase. 
(4) The economic sphere in Switzerland has also remained relatively trans-
parent to the citizens. As a country poor in natural resources, Switzerland 
has long been compelled to specialize in the secondary and tertiary economic 
sectors. In this way the development of large industrial concerns - with a 
few exceptions - has been quite limited5. This fact has necessarily affected 
labor relations, because the traditional conflict potential of a proletarianized 
laboring class could not develop as it did in other highly industrialized lands. 
The labor-movement assumed a different character. Foreign role-models were 
difficult to imitate, because the specific social situations were not found to 
be directly comparable. Given in addition Switzerland's political fragmenta-
tion and the strongly felt local loyalties and identities, a high degree of class 
antagonism could not develop. In addition, these specific conditions contribut-
ed to the fact that urbanization in Switzerland proceeded at a different rate 
from that in other countries. Even today, Switzerland, economically one of 
3 Only 84 enterprises have more than 1000 employees; 55% of the non-agricultural 
wage-earners work in enterprises with less than 50 employees. 
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the most developed countries of the world, shows the least degree of urban 
development among such countries. Less than one-third of the Swiss live in 
cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants; only five cities have more than 
100,000 inhabitants ( C L A R K [1980]). In other words, Swiss industry is predo-
minantly located in smaller towns and cities, and its labor force is for the 
most part recruited from these communities (low geographic mobility). Conse-
quently, the normal conditions contributing to worker-consciousness are not 
exactly those from which L E N I N ([1970], p. 235) expected a "spontaneous up-
rising of the masses", but rather a moderate "trade-unionism". These special 
structural features undoubtedly have had a considerable influence on the form 
assumed by labor conflicts and the employment of arbitration in them. 
(5) Another effective outlet which restrains the "inflation of conflict" is 
the plebicitarian element in the Swiss version of "semi-direct" democracy. 
Both the citizens' right of referendum, which binds the drafting of laws by 
parliament to the explicit (mandatory referendum) or the implicit (optional 
referendum) approval of the people (IMBODEN [1962], p. 30ff), and also the 
right of initiative, guarantee to the individual citizen and interest groups an 
additional, effective channel of influence in the political sphere. Thus it is 
not necessary for a conflict between interest groups to be fought to the finish 
by way of labor battles as the "ultima ratio". The possibilities of collective 
conflict resolution go far beyond the actual contractual relations. At the begin-
ning of the decision-making phases (initiatives) and at their conclusion (refer-
endum) the political system is open to social needs and interests, to contradic-
tions, alternatives and emotions. The increased risk of dissonance by itself 
compels, as a measure of safety, "compromises and consensus, as far as pos-
sible, for the smaller solutions" among the parlamentarians (NEIDHARDT 
[1975], p. 136). In exchange for the reduced freedom of manoeuvre, a further 
process for regulating conflict and building consensus has been created co-
operative representation. In the so-called "hearings procedure" (Vernehmlas-
sungsverfahren) interest groups are admitted to early stages of decision-making 
processes. Through the extra-parlamentary commissions of experts and the 
hearing procedures, an additional structure of representation in the pre-pariia-
mentary sphere has developed which competes with the parliamentary process 
for technical legitimacy. The actual selection processes occur here, helping 
to prevent an excess of "ex-post-conflicts and emotional polarizing", for in-
stance at the interest-group level (NEIDHARDT [1975], p. 319). 
3.1.2. Aspects of the Political Culture in Switzerland 
Being heavily influenced by and simultaneously having an influence on social-
structural features, a "political culture"6 has developed in Switzerland, which 
attributes a negative value to (at least open) confrontational behavior. 
6 Political culture is understood here as the total set of attitudinal patterns by which 
a socio-political system can be judged. 
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(1) The peacefulness of conflict resolution in Switzerland is in many ways I 
associated with the fairly long avoidance of the miseries of war, a benefit \ 
which offers the system as a whole a high degree of legitimacy. In reality \ 
the argumentation must go much deeper. L U E T H Y [1965] made it clear that 
the self-image of Switzerland is at root " in the true sense of the word archaic" 
and rests on mythical-religious foundation. It manifests itself in an exceptional 
awareness of historical continuity tied to the concept of state embodied in ] 
the old confederation of 1291 which is felt to be practically a native product. ] 
At the same time the traditional guarantee of being "proven and authentic \ 
Swiss'1 takes on a numinous character, which finds expression in public and 
private rules of behaviour based on the acceptance of this "eternal wisdom" 
( S A U R M A [ 1 9 7 4 ] , p. 369). 
On various occasions it has been repeatedly pointed out that the orientation 
and value system which manifests itself can be most appropriately labelled 
as "cooperativeness" {Genossenschaftlichkeit) (BEHRENDT [1963], p. 113). In \ 
this way the Pax helvetica is characterized as an aversion to "stratified, hier-
archically structured, rigorous and centralized, power system founded upon 
command and obedience" (BEHRENDT [1962], p. 134) or else as the most funda-
mental levelling-out {Horizont alisierung) of the society that is possible. Gasser 
even believes that it is in the autonomy of communities, with their readiness 
for responsibility and compromise over and above the party level, that is 
to be found the basic constitutional-historical principle which explains why 
democracies are stable or fragile (GASSER [1977], p. 5). This does not mean 
a priori that the frequency of conflict is less, but merely that the search for 
a typical and traditionally "Swiss" form of conflict resolution based on an 
acceptable consensus still possesses a exceptionally high degree of legitimacy 
today. In this connection, it must be noted that the arbitration system is 
quite extensive and perfected; that Switzerland itself resembles an amalgama-
tion of semi-autonomous institutions, which attempt to resolve their differ-
ences by avoiding state intervention as far as possible; and finally, that the 
basic principle of "good faith" as the guiding principle for implementation 
is never absent from these contractual agreements. Indeed, it is considered 
"impertinent" to "take advantage of a position of power {eine Machtstellung 
ganz 'auszusitzen'). Greater respect is afforded to maintaining communication 
with one another (in Swiss dialect: Me mues rede mitenand) than to the issuing 
of commands (except in battle) or of unilateral orders, even when those orders 
express the will of the majority. This is still true today ... especially in the 
relationship between social bargaining partners" ( R U H [1978], p. 7). The "co-
operative spirit" has evidently become an "historically sedimented experience" 
(Husserl) receiving expression through "pressure to conform to the pre-estab-
lished direction", through the "quasi pre-agreed" solution to problems and 
even through a certain amount of conflict avoidance (NEIDHARDT [1975]). 
(2) The self-image of the collective bargaining parties is also part of this 
general orientational framework. The preambles of the Peace Agreements 
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make it clear that the parties are committed to the "common good" (gemein-
sames Wohl), and are not motivated by the antagonism between employer 
and employee. Their goal is an enduring, continually expanding "coopera-
tion", and not the assertion of one-sided interest positions. Conclusion of 
a collective contract forms an instrument for that kind of cooperation which 
is based on a willingness to "reach a direct agreement over all questions". 
Former Union president W U E T H R I C H [1963] has stated that unions actually 
want to be "more than just a negotiating partner". According to ZANETTI 
([1981], p. 37) the unions are aiming to achieve a "communal system of com-
prehensive labor contracts", within which the collective contract will no longer 
be merely a temporary cease-fire, but rather have the form of a "professional 
statute". It is obvious that underlying this goal is the idea that the members 
of a profession would pursue their interests on the basis of the general interests 
of the profession and within the framework of a comprehensive professional 
community ( K A E P G E N [1976], p. 96). For this reason B E R W I N K E L [1962] also 
interprets the will expressed in the Peace Agreements by the Swiss social part-
ners to form a "professional community" (Berufsgemeinschaft), as a move 
away from a social orientation founded on interest groups. This view helps 
to explain, at least, the frequent reference in wage settlement contracts to 
joint action in economic questions and in dealing with third parties. Not 
only do employers make contributions to educational training and other union 
expenses, but also non-members are obliged by the Peace Agreement to make 
solidarity-contributions as financial reimbursement for the activities of the 
trade union or professional association. Lastly, it is also understandable that 
the usual arguments against trade-unions based on specific political orienta-
tions (Richtungsgewerkschaften), which hold that individualistic bargaining for 
the greatest individual advantage would lead to excesses at the expense of 
everyone concerned, have lost much of their applicability under these circum-
stances. In Switzerland the empirical evidence speaks for itself. Nevertheless 
its realization requires, as has been shown, that certain attitudes have achieved 
a substantial degree of approval. 
3.2. Is This System Applicable to the Federal Republic of Germany? 
When one finally turns to the question of the applicability or role-model 
function of the Peace Agreement and its prerequisites, the result is fairly ob-
vious. A look at the prevailing social structure shows that the corresponding 
possibility space is quite differently structured in the Federal Republic, for 
Switzerland and the Federal Republic differ in nearly all of the features speci-
fied here. The "negotiational culture" of the two countries has neither the 
same institutional substructure nor the same role-value. The same can be 
said for aspects of the political culture. Germany does not belong - as Gasser 
has stressed - to those countries in which "cooperativeness" has had a long 
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tradition and contributed to the founding of the state. Subsequently, it is not 
surprising that the self-image of the German collective bargaining parties is 
entirely different. Labor contracts speak neither of "partner-like cooperation" 
nor of "professional community". Although essential differences between the 
individual trade-unions should not be overlooked, the general impression re-
mains that union activity is predominantly interpreted as "conjunctive bar-
gaining" rather than "cooperative bargaining". It appears that a concept of 
countervailing-power (Gegenmacht) predominates for which the willingness 
to do battle is indispensable. For many trade-unions, this constant battle-
readiness is actually the counterpart of the control over the allocation of 
capital possessed by the industrialists (IG-Metall [1964], p.431ff.). It seems 
that class struggle is still the leading idea today, particularly in the metal-
working industry, although it is carried on by different means. If so, then I 
social partnership appears to be nothing more than a slogan. Even co-determi- | 
nation is in no way intended as such, according to statements by former j 
IG metal union leader O. Brenner, since it neither can nor will put an end J 
to the classical antagonism of interests. Trade unions are, just as before, in ! 
search of advantageous opportunities for shifting the lines of power (LUMMER J 
[1971], p. 138). Wage contracts are not "peace agreements", but rather "cease- f 
Fire documents" ( K A E M P G E N [1976], p. 84f.). The art of mediation is considered 
merely as a corrective means in the labor struggle, and not a prerequisite 
for industrial peace. For these reasons the transferability of the Peace Agree-
ment is considered questionable by most authors. It would only be possible, 
if "the groundwork on which a Peace Agreement stands, a professional com-
munity of social partners", as well as a basic renunciation of labor conflict 
were present (BERWINKEL [1962], p. 100f.), a groundwork which is lacking 
in the Federal Republic. The considerations dealing with the interest group 
problems presented above nonetheless showed that the fundamental question 
of modern industrial societies is not to be resolved by the escalation of conflict. 
When the objective nucleus of the Swiss Peace Agreement is taken into consid-
eration, its applicability as a model takes on another value: 
- It proves to be an applicable model because it offers a productive, actually-
practiced alternative to the conflict-theoretical perspective of interest group 
theory. 
- It is also applicable because it demonstrates by example that social contracts 
require a consensus as to the common ground-rules or, in other words, 
that the stability of a system of industrial relations is essentially an "ideologi-
cal", and not just a purely procedural problem (WOOD [1978], p. 55). 
- It is applicable, finally, because actual experience has refuted a series of 
prejudices, such as that every neo-corporative "professional community" 
would necessarily involve running counter to the principle of freedom of 
contract, or that dispensing with individualistic group competition would 
necessarily lead to the fraternization of collective bargaining units at the 
expense of the general public. 
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Nevertheless it is still an open question, even in Switzerland, to what extent 
the ground rules for consensus-seeking during changing economic and political 
situations are actually "sedimented". Even models can have cyclical trends 
economic, political and intellectual. And yet the swiss model of "cooperative 
bargaining" reflects such a long accepted tradition that the chance of its being 
maintained appears to be quite favorable. This traditional "negotiational cul-
ture" is itself rooted in a much deeper national identity, upon which additional 
political institutions having analagous structures are also based. And they 
provide the social partners with additional orientational guidelines for their 
dealings with one another. One can only risk making prognoses in this case 
if the weight (or the potential decline in weight) of this considerable tradition 
can really be evaluated. 
Summary 
In contrast to the classical, liberal conception interest groups in modern society 
have become influential, constructively functioning entities. A study of the 
collective bargaining partners (Tarifparteien) shows that in a society of interest 
groups (Verbandsgesellschaft), conflict is unable to serve as the exclusive prin-
ciple of organization: a minimum level of cooperation between interest groups 
is required in the public interest. The Swiss Peace Agreement is presented 
here as a form of collective bargaining which has proved successful over several 
decades. The prerequisites and functional conditions of this industrial Peace 
Agreement are analyzed in order to characterize the prime features of this 
form of group regulation of conflict. To transfer the Peace Agreement to 
the Federal Republic of Germany or other countries would meet with difficul-
ties on fundamental points; yet the Peace Agreement as an instructive model 
is nevertheless of significance for interest group research. 
Zusammenfassung 
Verbandskonflikte, Konsensbereitschaft und Cooperative Bargaining" 
Das Beispiel des Friedensabkommens in der Schweiz 
In der modernen Gesellschaft sind die Verbände, abweichend vom klassisch 
liberalen Selbstverständnis, zu einflußreichen, gestaltenden Instanzen gewor-
den. Anhand der Tarifparteien wird gezeigt, daß in der Verbandsgesellschaft 
der Konflikt als alleiniges Ordnungsprinzip nicht ausreicht; das Allgemein-
interesse macht ein Mindestmaß an Kooperation zwischen den Verbänden 
erforderlich. Als eine Form des ,cooperative bargaining", die sich schon über 
Jahrzehnte bewährt hat, wird das Schweizer Friedensabkommen vorgestellt. 
Um den Modellcharakter dieser verbandlichen Konfliktregelung zu bestim-
men, werden die Voraussetzungen und Funktionsbedingungen des Friedens-
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abkommens überprüft. Eine Übertragung auf die Bundesrepublik dürfte auf 
grundsätzliche Schwierigkeiten stoßen, gleichwohl ist das Friedensabkommen 
für die Verbandsforschung ein wichtiges Lehrstück. 
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